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ARGUMENT 
The Industrial Commission (Commission) in this matter found that Mr. Smith suffered an 
injury to his back on May 23, 1990. (R. 123). Mr. Smith had previously suffered no problems 
with his back. Id He injured his back in the course and scope of his employment while lifting a 
heavy pallet. IcL Subsequently, he underwent three surgeries to his back for a herniated disc. 
(R. 124). He has not worked since the accident and has been awarded total disability benefits by 
the Social Security Administration arising out of the same industrial accident. (R. 55 and 124). 
At the time of the accident Mr. Smith was forty-five years old. He cannot read a 
newspaper or balance a checkbook and has no formal education past the fifth grade. (R. 200). 
The medical panel convened at the request of the ALJ characterized his educational impairment 
as "severe." (R. 76). The medical panel has also found that Mr. Smith will need further medical 
treatment in the future, a finding which the Commission adopted as its own. (R. 75). 
The Commission sustained the ALJ's award of temporary total disability and permanent 
partial disability benefits arising out of the same industrial accident. Yet, the Commission 
denied the petitioner's claim for permanent total disability benefits upon the grounds that Mr. 
Smith had failed to show that his claimed total disability was medically caused by the industrial 
accident upon a preponderance of the evidence. This determination as to medical causation must 
be reversed because the Commission finding as to medical causation as to temporary total 
disability and permanent partial disability benefits and its conclusion as to medical causation are 
inconsistent. Additionally, the Commission failed to follow its own rules and procedures as well 
as the applicable law in reaching its conclusion as to medical causation. The Commission 
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avoided the sequential decision-making analysis as well as the odd lot doctrine. Finally, the 
Industrial Commission improperly relied upon the medical panel's conclusions. 
I. THE COMMISSION ACTUALLY FOUND MEDICAL CAUSATION 
Two findings of fact highlighted by Mity Lite in their brief form the crux of this appeal. 
"Much of Mr. Smith's current inability to return to work stems from factors other than the 
results of the injury." ALJ's findings as adopted by the Commission at R.101, cited in 
Respondent's Brief at 9 (emphasis added). So stated, the inverse must mean that some of Mr. 
Smith's current inability to return to work does in fact stem from the results of the industrial 
injury (i.e, medically caused). The commission further found: "A large portion of his disability 
is not caused by objective factors." (emphasis added). The Commission Order R. 135, cited in 
Respondent's Brief at 9. This statement as well, stated inversely, points out that some portion of 
Mr. Smith's disability is caused by objective factors related to the industrial accident. 
Essentially, the ALJ and the Commission factually found medical causation and then 
erroneously legally concluded that unless a disability is wholly caused by a work related injury, 
medical causation for the purposes of permanent total disability has not been shown. 
Mity Lite itself cites the ALJ findings, supported by the opinions of all doctors, that Mr. 
Smith: 
. . .will not be able to return to heavy lifting. The employer has shown a 
willingness to accommodate Mr. Smith although the positions which it offered 
were not found to be appropriate at this time until Mr. Smith is weaned from his 
narcotics and is conditioned for light duty or sedentary work. 
(R. 102, cited in Respondent's Brief at 10). Accordingly, at the time the Commission made its 
decision, there was no question that Mr. Smith could not do the heavy labor that he was doing at 
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the time of his industrial accident, and at the time of the Commission's review, could not even do 
light duty or sedentary work. 
Had the Industrial Commission found the facts to be different, then the basis for this 
appeal might not exist. Had the Commission stated "All of Mr. Smith's current inability to work 
stems from factors other than the results of the injury," or "none of his disability is caused by 
objective factors," then perhaps there would be a basis for the Industrial Commission to conclude 
that medical causation had not been found. In this case, medical causation had actually been 
found, but the Commission lost sight of that finding in its determination of permanent total 
disability, failed to apply its own rules, and failed to apply the odd lot doctrine.1 
Mity Lite argues that "unless the claimant has suffered a compensable industrial injury, 
[the odd lot] doctrine is inapplicable no matter how compelling the other factors." See Brief of 
Respondents at 17. Mity Lite cites this court's ruling in Zimmerman v. Industrial Commission 
of Utah, 785 P.2d 1127,1132 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) for this proposition. However, a review of 
lrThe question of the odd lot doctrine was clearly preserved below. First, there can be no 
question that the issue of medical causation has been preserved as that was the basis of 
petitioner's motion for review from the outset. Second, Commissioner Thomas Carlson's dissent 
to the Industrial Commission Order can only be reasonably construed as an odd lot analysis. 
Lastly, Mity Lite itself addressed the odd lot doctrine specifically in its response to applicant's 
motion for reconsideration. See Mity Lite's response at 3. Applicant was arguing that due to 
his age, educational background, training and mental capacity, he could be found disabled. 
While the term "odd lot" may not have been exhaustively and repetitiously used throughout the 
pleadings, the import of the petitioners argument is the same. That is, because the petitioner 
presented uncontroverted evidence of his impairment arising out of a compensable injury, and 
because he demonstrated an inability to perform the work required by his job, and due to his age, 
educational background, training and mental capacity, he was in fact permanently and totally 
disabled. 
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the Zimmerman decision shows that it supports the petitioner's argument. In Zimmerman, the 
medical panel convened at the request of the ALJ found: 
1. There is no medically demonstrable causal connection between the applicant's 
ongoing problems and the industrial accident.... 
2. All of the residual problems complained of by the accident were caused by a 
pre-existing condition. 
6. No portion of the permanent physical impairment is attributable to the 
applicant's industrial injury. 
Id at 1129. (emphasis added). Thus, in Zimmerman the medical panel found no causal 
connection between the claimed injuries and the industrial accident, that all the residual problems 
were due to a pre-existing condition, and that no portion of the permanent physical impairment 
was attributable to the industrial injury. Thus, a finding of no medical causation was supported 
by the evidence in Zimmerman. 
In contrast, in the present case, such exclusive findings were not found, nor could be 
found, under the evidence before the Commission. By adopting the medical penal report, the 
Commission implicitly found (1) that Mr. Smith had experienced no problems with his back 
prior to the industrial accident (R. 71, 74); (2) that he has a 13% whole person permanent 
impairment to his low back, 2/3 of which is attributable to the industrial accident and 
characterized by the Commission as "not inconsequential," (R. 125); and (3) that Mr. Smith's 
industrial injury to his back contributes to his current disability. (R. 74-76). The foregoing facts, 
coupled with the Commission's acknowledgment that Mr. Smith has not worked since his 
industrial accident, makes it obvious that the Commission found that Mr. Smith's pre-existing 
back problems, if any, had been asymptomatic, but are now significant. While reviewing only a 
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single industrial accident, the Commission arrived at the untenable conclusion that it should 
award permanent partial impairment benefits and temporary total disability benefits for a 
"compensable injury", but not permanent total disability benefits due to a lack of medical 
causation, or in other words, a failure to show a nexus to a "compensable injury." Such a 
conclusion by the Commission is illogical, irrational, and erroneous. 
Both temporary total disability and permanent partial disability awards require a finding 
of medical causation. See Utah Code Annotated § 35-1-66 and § 35-1-45 as well as Allen v. 
Industrial Commission. 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986V See also Crosland v. Industrial Comm.. 828 
P.2d 528 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).2 Accordingly, it is simply inconsistent for the Industrial 
Commission to claim that medical causation was shown as to permanent partial and temporary 
total disability, but to bar a claim for permanent total disability benefits upon a factual finding 
that medical causation had not been shown. For this reason, the Industrial Commission's Order 
must be reversed. 
II. MR. SMITH'S PSYCHIATRIC PROBLEMS DO NOT BAR THE APPLICATION 
OF THE ODD LOT DOCTRINE OR A FINDING OF MEDICAL CAUSATION 
In paragraph 19 of the ALJ's findings of fact which the Commission adopted, the ALJ 
stated: 
Petitioner recognizes that in Zupon v. Industrial Commission. 860 P.2d 960, 963 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1993), this court held that a finding of permanent partial disability 15 years before a 
claim of permanent total disability did not preclude a finding of no medical causation under the 
Allen test. However, in Zupon a substantial period of time had passed between the permanent 
partial disability finding and the permanent total disability claim. More importantly, in Zupon 
the Social Security Administration had granted permanent total disability benefits for injuries 
that were not industrial. In reality, the Zupon holding rested upon the fact that the claimed 
disability had no relationship at all to an industrial accident. 
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Much of Mr. Smith's current inability to work stems from factors other than the 
results of the injury. He has a personality disorder according to both the 
psychiatrists on the medical panel (Dr. Burgoyne) and the psychologists (Dr. 
McCann) who performed the independent medical examination. The personality 
disorder pre-existed his physical injury. Dr. Burgoyne agreed with the diagnosis 
of Dr. McCann. 
Mity Lite maintains that such a finding presents substantial evidence in support of the 
Commission's conclusion of no medical causation as to the claim for permanent total disability 
in this matter. In fact, Mity Lite goes on to define for this court the terms "conversion disorder", 
"somatoform", and "psychogenesis". The underlying current of Mity Lite's brief is that given 
Mr. Smith's psychological disabilities, a finding of medical causation could not be sustained. 
This is inaccurate for several reasons. 
The mental acuity and psychological health of Mr. Smith did not prevent his working 
prior to the industrial accident at issue. Additionally, the psychological factors actually have no 
bearing on the issue of medical causation. Where the Commission, like the ALJ, had already 
found that some of his disability was attributable to the industrial accident, medical causation had 
already been found. The fact that a person has problems other than those directly caused by an 
industrial accident does not preclude a finding of medical causation as to permanent total 
disability. 
Lastly, to support Mity Lite's and the Commission's position that the psychological 
aspects of Mr. Smith's condition preclude a finding of medical causation ignores the Utah 
Supreme Court case of Spencer v. Industrial Commission. 733 P.2d 158 (Utah 1987). In 
Spencer, the Industrial Commission's Order was reversed where permanent total disability 
benefits had been denied under the doctrine of res judicata. While remanding the matter, the 
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Supreme Court of Utah made additional comments which are germane here. In Spencer, a 
claimant was alleged to have "factitious seizure disorder," "conversion reaction," or "hysterical 
conversion symptoms." Similar assertions have bene made in this case. However, there has 
been no showing in this matter that Mr. Smith's drug habits pre-existed his industrial accident. It 
must be noted that the opiate drugs that he takes were prescribed by health care providers treating 
him for the injuries suffered in the industrial accident. While the psychiatrists did find that some 
of Mr. Smith's psychological problems, such as depression, pre-existed the industrial accident, 
there is no evidence that such psychological problems precluded him from carrying on any 
employment. The court in Spencer held: 
The medical panel's findings and the administrative law judge's adoption of those 
findings of permanent partial impairment conclusively establish the legitimacy of 
Spencer's impairment. 
Id at 162. The same could be said in the present case. The medical panel and administrative law 
judge did find a permanent impairment directly attributable to the industrial accident. The 
Spencer court went on to state: 
When there has been a physical accident or trauma and a claimant's disability is 
increased or prolonged by traumatic neurosis, conversion hysteria, or hysteria 
paralysis, it is now uniformly held that the full disability including the effects of 
the neurosis is compensable. 
Id. Thus, many of the psychological problems currently suffered by Mr. Smith are in fact 
attributable to the accident. While some of these psychological problems may have pre-existed 
the accident, they were exacerbated by the industrial accident in such a way as to preclude him 
from working. This is an established fact since Mr. Smith worked and supported his family prior 
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to the industrial accident. Obviously, conversion disorder, if claimed to be a product of the 
present claim, arose out of the industrial accident at issue. 
In sum, the fact that Mr. Smith has psychological problems, some of which may have 
even pre-existed the industrial accident, does not bar a finding of permanent total disability nor 
the application of the odd lot doctrine. 
III. THE ODD LOT DOCTRINE IS APPLICABLE 
Mity Lite claims the odd lot doctrine does not apply because the petitioner was forty-five 
years old, had a rate of pay between four and six dollars an hour, and evidence existed that Mity 
Lite would tailor a job to fit his circumstances. The foregoing facts, even if all true, would not 
preclude the invocation of the odd lot doctrine. 
The age of an individual is a factor to be considered, but is not conclusive. Mity Lite has 
cited no case law whatsoever which would indicate that age of an individual is determinative. In 
any event, the Commission could have concluded that at the age of forty-five and given the 
educational background of Mr. Smith, the amount of education necessary to make him a viable 
candidate for any work would be too great to justify. Likewise, his rate of pay argues in favor of 
a finding of total disability under the odd lot doctrine, not against it. The fact that Mr. Smith has 
never made more than six dollars an hour is indicative of the fact that his jobs in the past have 
been exclusively manual labor requiring no real job skills. 
Lastly, Mity Lite's assertion that they would tailor a job for Mr. Smith is irrelevant and in 
any event is not supported by substantial evidence. Mity Lite attempted at the hearing in this 
matter by way of hearsay evidence to prove Robert Smith could have received other 
employment. Recognizing the hearsay problems, the ALJ only conditionally allowed in records 
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of alternative employment. (R. 232). As explained in petitioners principle brief, to find 
alternative employment availability based upon hearsay alone constitutes reversible error. See 
Hoskins v. Industrial Commission. 918 P.2d 150, 158 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
Mity Lite has wholly failed to distinguish the applicability of Hardman v. Salt Lake City 
Fleet Management. 725 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1986) and Marshall v. Industrial Commission. 681 P.2d 
208 (Utah 1984). In both Hardman and Marshall applicants were found to be totally and 
permanent disabled although only a relatively small percentage of their physical impairment was 
due to an industrial accident. Hardman and Marshall are directly applicable to the present matter 
in that it remains uncontroverted that Robert Smith suffered a compensable injury. The 
Commission's Order simply cannot be reasonably interpreted as providing a factual finding that 
no compensable injury occurred. If it could, the Commission would not have granted Mr. Smith 
any benefits. 
In sum, the Commission in fact found that a compensable injury had occurred, and that 
that same compensable injury constituted a part of Mr. Smith's claimed disability. At that point, 
the Commission had found medical causation and should have applied the sequential decision-
making analysis as mandated by statute and the odd lot doctrine as mandated by law. Because it 
did not apply these standards, the Commission's order must be reversed and this matter 
remanded. 
The applicability of the present factual situation to the odd lot doctrine was well argued 
by Commissioner Carlson in his dissent to the Industrial Commission Order. 
The fact that Mr. Smith suffered an industrial accident on May 23, 1990 is 
admitted. Before the accident, he worked and supported his family. After the 
accident, he underwent a series of back surgeries that left him in pain and 
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dependent on medications. Furthermore, he is now forty-five years old, has only a 
fifth grade education and is functionally illiterate. In this day and age, it is 
practically impossible for Mr. Smith to compete with younger, stronger, healthier 
workers for the few unskilled light duty jobs he is theoretically qualified to 
perform. In my view, Mr. Smith's injury at work unleashed a cascade of events 
that has left him permanently and totally disabled. This opinion is supported by 
the fact that Mr. Smith has been awarded social security disability benefits for 
essentially the same injuries that are at issue in this Worker's Compensation case. 
(R. 127). Both the Commission below and Mity Lite argue that a large portion of Mr. Smith's 
disability arises out of his mental condition. However, as the law clearly provides, the odd lot 
doctrine takes into consideration mental capacity. Thus, Mr. Smith's mental deficiencies argue 
in favor of, not against, the application of the odd lot doctrine. 
Because the Industrial Commission found that a compensable injury had occurred, it 
should have applied the odd lot doctrine. Because the Industrial Commission denied Mr. Smith's 
claim on an erroneous basis, the order of the Industrial Commission must be reversed. 
IV. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ORDER MUST BE REVERSED BECAUSE 
IT FAILED TO APPLY THE SEQUENTIAL DECISION MAKING PROCESS 
By way of Utah Code Annotated § 35-1-67(1) (1988) the legislature of the State of Utah 
provided that an employee is entitled to receive compensation when their permanent total 
disability is caused by an industrial accident. The legislature in § 35-1-67(1) mandated in 
pertinent part: 
The Commission shall adopt rules that conform to the substance of the sequential 
decision making process of the social security administration under 20, C.F.R. 
subsections 404.1520(b), (c), (d), (e), and (f)(1) and (2) as revised. 
The Industrial Commission followed the mandate of the legislature and promulgated Utah 
Administrative Code R. 490-1-17. See. R.490-1-17 reproduced in its entirety in Addendum Four 
of Petitioner's Principle Memorandum. R. 490-l-17(A) provides: 
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The Commission is required under Section 35-1-67, U.C.A., to make a finding of 
total disability as measured by the substance of the sequential decision-making 
process of the Social Security Administration, under Title 20 of the Code of 
Federal Regulations, as revised. 
(emphasis added). Thus, unlike Mity Lite in the present matter, the Commission itself construed 
Utah Code Annotated § 35-1-67 to require the application of the sequential decision-making 
process. In this matter, the Commission promulgated rules requiring certain actions on its part, 
and then failed to follow its own rules. Interestingly, the Commission could have made a 
determination of permanent total disability without looking to the sequential decision making 
process if it had chosen to follow the invitation of R. 490-l-17(B) which allows the Commission 
to use the Social Security Administration's determination as to disability in lieu of instituting a 
process on its own behalf. In this matter, Mr. Smith had been awarded permanent total disability 
status by the Social Security Administration. (R.55). 
R. 490-1-17(d) provides: 
To make a tentative finding of permanent total disability the Commission shall 
rely upon and be guided by the rules of disability determination published by the 
Social Security Administration Office of Disability Publication SSA, Pub, No. 64-
104, as amended. In short, the sequential decision-making process referred to 
requires a series of questions and evaluations to be made in sequence. These are: 
1. Is the claimant engaged in a substantial gainful activity? 
2. Does the claimant have a medically severe impairment? 
3. Does the severe impairment meet or equal the listed impairments in 
appendix one of SSA, Pub, No. 64-104? 
4. Does the impairment prevent the claimant from doing his or her previous 
work? 
Three out of four of the questions of the sequential making process can be answered from 
the Commission's order alone. As to question number one, Mr. Smith is not engaged in a 
substantial gainful activity. The Industrial Commission itself noted that Mr. Smith has not 
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worked since his industrial accident. Question number two must be answered in the affirmative 
as the Commission itself stated that Mr. Smith suffers from a back impairment due to his 
industrial accident which is "not inconsequential." Lastly, the Commission by adopting the 
medical panel's report specifically found that his impairment does prevent Mr. Smith from doing 
his previous work of heavy lifting. Whether the impairment of Mr. Smith meets or equals the list 
of impairments in appendix one of SSA, Pub. No. 64-104 is a determination which will need to 
be made on remand. Likewise, the evaluation and rehabilitation workup of the state office of 
rehabilitation awaits a determination on remand. Such a determination by the state office of 
rehabilitation is required by R. 490-1-17. 
In sum, Utah Code Annotated § 35-1-67 provides for the Commission to enact R. 490-1-
17 and the Commission in fact adopted these rules and now should be required to follow them. 
The rules themselves state that the Commission is required to review a claim of total disability as 
measured by the substance of the sequential decision-making process. Accordingly, the 
Commission's conclusion that "it is therefore unnecessary to consider the subsidiary elements of 
the 'sequential decision making process' of § 35-1-67 of the Act" is erroneous. 
CONCLUSION 
When the Commission found that a significant permanent back impairment existed which 
was related to the industrial accident, and further found that Mr. Smith could not return to his 
prior employment of heavy lifting due to that same permanent impairment, medical causation 
had been proven. Thus, the Commission's conclusions are not supported by the facts or the law. 
Instead, where it is found that an industrial accident makes up part of a disability claim, the claim 
should go forth through the sequential decision-making analysis, the Department of Vocational 
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Rehabilitation, and review of whether the odd lot doctrine is applicable. The law simply 
mandates this procedure and the Industrial Commission must therefore be reversed. 
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DAVID N. MORTENSEN 
SHERLYNN WHITE FENSTERMAKER 
IVIE & YOUNG 




I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct oepy of the foregoing Appellate 
Brief with postage prepaid thereon this day of February, 1997, to the following: 
9642.all 
Gerald J. Llatin 
Sandra N. Dredge 
226 West 2230 North, Suite 100 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Erie Boorman 
EMPLOYERS' REINSURANCE FUND 
P.O. Box 146611 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6611 
Allan Hennebold 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
160 East 300 South, #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
DAVID N. MORTENSEN 
IVIE & YOUNG 
Attorney for Petitioner 
14 
